Morality has been at the center of informal talks and metaphysical discussions since the beginning of history.Recently, converging lines of evidence from evolutionary biology, neuroscience and experimental psychology have shown that morality is grounded in the brain.This article reviews the main lines of investigation indicating that moral behavior is a product of evolutionary pressures that shaped the neurobehavioral processes related to the selective perception of social cues, the experience of moral emotions and the adaption of behavioral responses to the social milieu. These processes draw upon speci¢c cortical^subcortical loops that organize social cognition, emotion and motivation into uniquely human forms of experience and behavior. We put forth a model of brain^behavior relationships underlying moral reasoning and emotion that accommodates the impairments of moral behavior observed in neuropsychiatric disorders. This model provides a framework for empirical testing with current methods of neurobehavioral analysis. NeuroReport14:299^305
INTRODUCTION
Debates on the moral nature of man have occupied the center of discussions among theologians, philosophers, and layman for millennia. Only recently have we been able to delve empirically into the neural organization of moral behavior. These advances stem from the analysis of patients with drastic changes in social behavior as a result of acquired brain lesions [1, 2] as well as from the study of normal and pathologic behavior with structural and functional neuroimaging. These lines of evidence have shown that a great deal of human behavior is implicitly moral and results from multiple psychological and neurobiological processes that lie on a theoretical continuum that ranges between the extremes of prosociality and antisociality.
Morally driven actions have traditionally been attributed to logical and verbally mediated processes referred to as moral reasoning and judgment [3] . However, conscientious logical-verbal statements often fail to predict moral conduct in real life. The concomitant recognition of moral emotions as a powerful motto behind human behavior has encouraged the testing of hypotheses on the behavior of patients with developmental or acquired antisocial behavior as a result of brain damage [4] . Although still in an early phase, the results of such investigations already suggest ingenious solutions for paradoxes such as that of 'talking good and acting badly' and shed new light on uniquely human neurobiological attributes.
MORAL EMOTIONS
Social sensitivity and cognition lie at the heart of the evolution of mankind. These aptitudes, already developed in our primate and hominid ancestors [5] , include the assimilation of rules based on reward/punishment and the attribution of intentions, beliefs, feelings and desires to other people [6] . Higher primates exhibit a vast human-like repertoire of social behaviors and are constantly charting their social environment in terms of dominance and reputation cues. Chimpanzees, for example, display behaviors deeply entrenched in reciprocal altruism that are essential for competition for social status, both on an individual basis or through the organization of coalitions. As in humans, a sense of righteousness and justice permeates their interindividual behavior [7] . These abilities are now interpreted as genuine forerunners of human morality [8] .
Haidt advanced an elaborate account of moral emotions, also referred to as social or sociomoral [9] . Whereas basic emotions spring from ideas, imagination, recollections, or perceptions endowed with immediate personal relevance, moral emotions are linked to the interest or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent [10] . Therefore, moral emotions are evoked by circumstances that extend beyond the immediate sphere of the self. Moral emotions are so critical for the promotion of group cohesiveness and order that they must have been present in early man as a major ingredient of hunting as well as food-sharing and gathering [11] . Guilt, gratitude and compassion are examples of prosocial moral emotions. Moral emotions may also act to promote group dissolution and social reorganization. Examples of such emotions include contempt, indignation and xenophobia [12] . Haidt proposes that moral behavior is primarily instantiated by spontaneous, implicit and effortless emotional dispositions. For the most part, moral emotions operate automatically and unconsciously, drawing on metaphorical and holistic modes of thinking. Only the results of such assessments eventually gain access into consciousness, so that morality permeates our lives mostly on the fringe of conscious awareness. The swiftness with which moral emotions invade conscious awareness makes them appear embedded in perceptions, memories and thoughts. These 'moral intuitions' are elicited by certain attributes of stimuli in the same manner that color and pitch contribute to the corresponding visual and auditory perceptions in the mind of the observer. The moral dimension of human nature is so pervasive that people tend to anthropomorphize their interactions even with inanimate matter and non-figurative designs according to references that are implicitly moral [13] .
MORAL CALCULUS
There are situations in which spontaneously evoked emotions fail or are insufficient to deal with contextual demands. These demands are typical of situations involving moral dilemmas [14] . A moral dilemma is a problem situation in which dissonant moral emotions of roughly comparable strength are elicited, giving rise to a slow and effortful process often referred to as moral reasoning. In such circumstances, moral decision-making or moral judgment becomes heavily dependent on analytical and logicalverbal modes of thinking. These processes presuppose that the expression of the inner conflict between moral emotions be suppressed so that actions are guided by the interplay of the predicted outcomes of individual choices in an uncertain terrain of possibilities. Higher-order cognitive abilities become decisive in these contexts, and planning, executive flexibility and strategy application must work in the service of actions whose original motivation is moral-emotional.
MORAL INSANITYAND MORAL SANCTITY
Moral behavior stems from a delicate balance between prosocial and altruistic behaviors at one extreme, and antisocial and selfish behaviors, at the other. Most adults seem to ponder the odds of each situation so that the outcome is generally reinforcing for cooperative social interactions [15] . There is much evidence showing that a considerable part of human suffering due to the misconduct of others is rooted in behaviors collectively known as antisocial [16] . More than one-half of prison inmates have at least one neuropsychiatric diagnosis, the most prevalent among these being antisocial personality, alcoholism, and illicit drug dependency [17] . The spectrum of antisocial behaviors is rather wide and each one of its elements can be seen in isolation or in relative preeminence in a given individual. In a broad sense, antisocial behaviors may range from minor infractions, such as cheating in card games with friends, to bank robbery and cold-blooded murder [18] .
Psychopathy stands out as a major cause of recurrent and severe antisocial behavior in modern society [19] . Psychopathy is a type of antisocial personality that was recognized in the 19th century as moral insanity [20] and is defined by a peculiar association of emotional traits and behavioral proclivities [21] . A most astonishing characteristic of psychopaths resides in their ability to tell right from wrong [22] . Their knowledge of how to behave appropriately, however, is only rhetorical and wields little, if any, impact on the guidance of their actions in real contexts. Psychopaths are the best example of the dissociation between knowing good and acting good. Therefore, it is not uncommon to listen to the poignant talk of a psychopath to a young audience against drug dealers and the evils of modern society, only to see him acting exactly in the opposite way a moment later. In fact, psychopaths may be even more moralistic and selfrighteous than ordinary people [23] . This bizarre dissociation of knowing from acting has led some authors to suggest that a new legal construct is needed to account for the inability to regulate one's behavior despite the availability of requisite knowledge [24] .
The interest in the neurobehavioral underpinnings of antisocial behavior was revitalized by the analysis of patients with persistent changes of personality as a result of acquired brain damage. This condition has been called acquired sociopathy [1, 2, 4] and results from injury to specific brain sites, particularly the orbitomedial and polar frontal cortex [2, [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] , the anterior temporal lobe [36] , the superomedial frontal lobe [37] , and certain related subcortical nuclei, particularly the amygdala [38, 39] , ventromedial hypothalamus [40, 41] , dorsomedial thalamus [42] and head of the caudate nucleus or anterior limb of internal capsule [43, 44] . There is also consistent evidence that antisocial behavior may result from unilateral hemispheric lesions [1, 25, 45, 46] , as an adverse effect of treatment with fluoxetine [47] or abuse of alcohol and illicit drugs [48] . The above citations refer to patients in whom investigators documented a clear dissociation between impaired social behavior and preserved overall cognition (i.e. no dementia) and no overt manic symptoms. In other cases, focal antisocial symptoms, such as kleptomania [49] and car robbery [50] , arise from anterior frontal lobe damage. Sociopathic behavior has also been related to frontopolar (FPC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) dysfunction in functional neuroimaging studies of mania [51] .
The apparent multiplicity of forebrain sites whose damage is associated with antisocial behavior does not necessarily mean that acquired sociopathy is a non-specific product of brain damage. However, the alleged specificity of ventromedial prefrontal damage in acquired sociopathy [52] must be tempered by negative evidence from patients with seemingly strategic frontal lobe damage who otherwise never develop antisocial behavior [53, 54] . Patient SR [55] , who sustained a massive destruction of the polar and mediobasal parts of both frontal lobes, had all the 'right' ingredients that supposedly give rise to sociopathy. She became profoundly abulic, but never overtly antisocial. The anterior cingulate, superomedial and dorsolateral divisions of the frontal lobes, whose damage is typically associated with abulia, were also destroyed. Observations such as these suggest that acquired sociopathy only emerges as a symptom of brain damage when destruction and sparing of specific neural structures occur in certain combinations [56] .
Many individuals with acquired sociopathy lack the callous personality traits that characterize developmental psychopaths. They do behave in socially inadequate ways, but not specifically to take advantage of others. The antisocial acts committed by many acquired sociopaths are rather due to impulsiveness and lack of foresight than to an evil and premeditated intention to take advantage of others [57] . However, a significant minority of brain-damaged patients with intact premorbid personalities does seem to meet stringent criteria for a severe form of behavioral change that is clinically indistinguishable from developmental psychopathy [41, 58] . A prevailing view is that this depends, critically, on the age at which the brain damage is inflicted [1, 25, 45] . According to this view, early injury to critical sectors of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) would prevent the timely internalization of social conventions and moral rules, leading to the bizarre impairments of interpersonal behavior. An alternative possibility, that the severity of personality change is primarily determined by lesion topography and premorbid personality traits, has not been investigated yet.
A less explored aspect of moral behavior lies at the extreme of prosociality. Colby and Damon [59] showed that the altruistic behavior of moral exemplars is underlined by a lack of clear distinctions between moral and personal goals and the overlap between moral judgment and conduct. The moral actions of these individuals are accomplished without much conscious effort or self-awareness. The moral engagement of ordinary people with similar moral beliefs, in contrast, varies considerably. According to these authors, the unity of moral and personal goals in moral exemplars does not rely upon better moral reflection skills. One possibility, that moral emotions represent a major driving mechanism for prosocial behaviors, remains to be empirically tested.
NEUROIMAGING, MORAL JUDGMENT AND MORAL EMOTION
In recent years functional neuroimaging has become established as a powerful tool to study the neural underpinnings of emotional experience. More recently, functional brain imaging studies have started to address the moral domain. In an initial effort to tackle moral-related processing in normal individuals, we used fMRI to explore brain activation patterns related to a simple moral judgment task [60] . Subjects were scanned during the auditory presentation of short statements and were instructed to silently make categorical judgments (right vs wrong) on each. Some statements had an explicit moral content (We break the law if necessary, The elderly are useless), while others were factual statements without moral content (Stones are made of water, Telephones never ring). When the moral condition was contrasted to the factual one, the FPC and the medial frontal gyrus (Brodmann's areas 9/10) were consistently activated across subjects (Fig. 1) . Other activations included the right anterior temporal cortex, left angular gyrus and basal forebrain. While the degree of emotionality of stimuli was directly related to the right anterior temporal and subcortical activations, it played only an ancillary role in PFC activation [61] . An unpublished analysis revealed an increase in functional connectivity between the left FPC and the OFC, anterior temporal and anterior cingulate cortices, in addition to subcortical and limbic structures such as the thalamus, midbrain and basal forebrain, during the performance of moral judgments. This suggests that a cortico-limbic network is recruited during the performance of moral judgments.
Greene et al. [62] have addressed another important aspect of the moral domain. Using fMRI, they investigated brain activation to different kinds of moral judgment. Normal subjects were exposed to moral and non-moral dilemmas that were structurally more complex than the simple statements described above, probably imposing a higher load of reasoning. They were divided into moral-personal (the agent directly inflicts an injury to another person to avoid a worse disaster) and moral-impersonal (the agent does it in indirect ways, such as by pressing a button). Despite differences in task design, the moral-personal condition evoked similar activations in the FPC, precuneus and angular gyrus, as compared to our moral judgment task.
Since the PFC activations reported above could potentially reflect interactions between decision making and nonspecific emotional arousal, cognitive demands, or unsolvable anagram effects [63] , we carried out a follow-up fMRI study employing an experimental design that included judgment of moral and non-moral, emotionally charged, situations. A similar judgment task was employed to evaluate brain responses to judgments in the following conditions: moral emotional, non-moral emotional, nonmoral unemotional (neutral) and scrambled [64] . This allowed the exploration of differential effects of moral and non-moral emotional judgments on brain activation. The statements described social contexts, thus equating the effects of social scenarios. The left medial OFC and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) were more strongly activated by moral judgments, while the extended amygdala/ basal forebrain and regions of the visual cortex were active during non-moral social judgments associated with unpleasant emotions. These results were replicated in an adjunctive unreported study using the same design, except that two types of moral emotional statements were used: statements that preferentially evoked pity/compassion (The man lost his sick wife, They saw a lost child in the middle of the crowd) or indignation/anger (The boy stole his mother's savings, The judge condemned the innocent man). Judgments evoking indignation activated the OFC and right anterior temporal lobe, while those associated with compassion strongly activated the insula and dorsolateral PFC bilaterally (Fig. 2) . Conjunction analysis revealed that the posterior medial frontal and subcallosal gyri were activated by both moral conditions. In contrast, the extended amygdala/basal forebrain and left anterior insula responded more strongly to basic unpleasant emotionrelated statements (which conveyed core disgust and/or fear). Though still preliminary, these results suggest that particular aspects of sociomoral appraisals may be traced to partially dissociable brain networks. The fMRI findings of Farrow and colleagues [65] provide further support to this idea. They reported partially overlapping activations in the OFC, superior frontal gyrus and precuneus when empathic and forgiveness judgments were compared to a social reasoning baseline task.
As stated before, the logical-verbal system is required for both moral and factual reasoning. Although reasoning may evoke emotional experiences, the latter are often triggered automatically by environmental stimuli. A more recent fMRI study was designed to assess the spontaneous brain responses to emotional stimuli in normal subjects who passively viewed pictures depicting moral violations, nonmoral unpleasant scenes, and unemotional ones [66] . Moral stimuli included abandoned children, war scenes and interpersonal aggression, while unpleasant, non-moral scenes included dangerous animals, mutilated bodies and disgusting body products. Both moral and unpleasant nonmoral conditions activated the amygdala, midbrain, thalamus, and extrastriate visual cortex, in agreement with previous studies of unpleasant emotion processing [67, 68] . The right medial OFC and posterior STS, together with the medial frontal gyrus, were preferentially recruited by the moral pictures (Fig. 3) , suggesting a critical role of an OFC-STS network in the generation of moral emotions. A functional connectivity analysis showed a strong coupling between the medial OFC and the medial PFC, STS and precuneus, supporting the hypothesis of a specific functional network underlying moral appraisals [66] .
THE CEREBRAL ORGANIZATION OF MORALS
Moral sensitivity depends on a human specialization of neural systems that have been implicated in other cognitive and emotional processes of mammals in general [7] . While it is not tenable to derive a neural model of moral behavior that pinpoints a single, dedicated brain region (i.e. the moral center of the brain), it is possible to identify several key regions that may be important for moral behavior (Fig. 4) . As a rule, the moral behavior stream requires decoding by sensory systems, activation of basic emotional reactions by anteromedial temporal, brain stem and basal forebrain structures, attachment of moral-emotional relevance by orbital and medial prefrontal structures, and implementation and control of actions by the frontal lobes [69] . The surveillance and orienting systems, for which the thalamic reticular nucleus and ascending activating systems are critical [70] , help orchestrate these mechanisms into a dynamic behavioral stream. According to this model, dysfunction at specific nodes of these distributed corticalsubcortical networks is at the root of a variety of social behavior changes. The heuristics of the model will be illustrated with functional imaging evidence pointing to the Medial orbitofrontal (medOFC), frontopolar (FPC) and anterior cingulate (aCC) cortex: Patients with OFC lesions, especially in its medial sectors, may develop changes in the interpersonal emotional domain. OFC lesions may also impair the reversal learning of social and non-social contingencies [71] . Because of the intrinsically dynamic nature of social interactions and their importance for moral behavior, OFC patients may show disproportionate impairments in social behavior. Functional imaging studies have demonstrated that voluntary inhibition of naturally occurring motivations, such as imagined aggressive or sexual impulses, recruits the activation of OFC and aCC, while a lack of inhibition is associated with a functional shut down of OFC activity [72, 73] , findings that are in agreement with the inadequate suppression of untoward impulses in patients with damage to these brain regions. The FPC, a highly differentiated sector of the PFC [74] , has been largely overlooked in current models of social cognition [75, 76] . While the OFC is linked to automatic social-emotional responses [66] contingent on reward and punishment [71, [77] [78] [79] , the FPC and the medial frontal cortex (medFC) are involved in more abstract reasoning processes, such as prospective evaluations, emotional self-regulation, planning, strategy application, theory-of-mind and social judgment [60, 61, 69, [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] , abilities that may be essential for moral behavior in highly structured interpersonal settings. The role of the FPC in the maintenance of a main goal while subgoals are processed may be related to the execution of the long-term plans that are critical for the establishment of enduring interpersonal relationships and joint enterprises [83, 86] . The aCC is a paralimbic cortical area that has been extensively implicated in decision-making, conflict detection, reward tracking and emotional control [87] . Damage to the aCC leads to a decrease in behavioral spontaneity [88] , a phenomenon that may be related to the role of this region in the adjustment of attentional effort to specific tasks in normal subjects [89] . Since these processes are important for the expression of motivated behavior in general, they are probably essential for the implementation of moral behavior.
Superior temporal sulcus (STS):
The STS region works in concert with the fusiform gyrus and amygdala to integrate visual and linguistic cues into intentionality and social appraisals [90, 91] . Consistent with this view, the STS responds preferentially to moral violations vs. faces, while the inverse pattern holds for the fusiform gyrus [66] . STS activation is observed in response to moral judgments made on written stimuli [64] , suggesting that the STS responses in complex social-moral contexts are not dependent on visual features per se. These observations predict that dysfunction of the perceptual systems that decode social stimuli will impair social intercourse. Deficient attribution of intentionality, which is not restricted to the visual modality [92] , has been related to abnormal STS-amygdala circuitry in functional imaging studies of autistic patients [93] .
Anterior temporal cortex (aTC), amygdala (Amyg), insula and precuneus (preCun): Damage to the anterior temporal cortex or to its immediate subcortical connections with the amygdala gives rise to the Klü ver-Bucy syndrome [94] . Temporo-polar lesions, especially in the right hemisphere, usually present with severe changes in social behavior [95] . Amygdala lesions impair the perception of fear, anger and disgust in both the visual and auditory modalities, leading to deficits in social interactions [96] [97] [98] . A lack of response to distressful stimuli in psychopaths has been attributed to amygdala dysfunction [99] . The amygdala is activated in response to aversive stimuli mediated through language [64, 100, 101] , by the evaluation of outcomes [102] , in making choices [103] , in classical conditioning [104] , and during subliminal perception [105] , abilities that are important for social behavior. Together, the temporo-polar cortex, insula, precuneus and their connections seem to be an essential part of an extended neural circuit that attributes conscious emotions and feelings, especially those with a personal and social content, to ongoing perceptions and ideations [106] .
Thalamus, midbrain (Tha/midb), and basal forebrain (BFB): The region of the cerebral hemispheres that lies beneath the anterior commissure and lenticular nucleus harbors complex fiber systems and nuclei. The nucleus basalis of Meynert, the extended amygdala and the ventral striopallidal nuclei are the main structures of this region, which is generally referred to as basal forebrain. Neural ensembles in the basal forebrain, hypothalamus, medial thalamus and midbrain are critical for the regulation of the internal milieu and for structuring biological drives, motivations and basic emotional experiences. Thus, only relatively discrete lesions of this area are compatible with survival. Lesions of the basal forebrain, which may extend to the transitional area in the medial posterior OFC, septal region and ventromedial hypothalamus, often manifest by perverted motivations in instinctive domains, which are intuitively interpreted as crude moral violations [107] [108] [109] [110] . Similarly, thalamic lesions extending to the upper midbrain were reported in an adult patient presenting with childish and inadequate social behavior [111] , as well as in other varieties of disordered behavior [42] .
The above model accommodates many apparently discrepant data on conditions marked by impairments of moral behavior, allowing the formulation of hypotheses on the breakdown of moral comportment. The possible relationships between morality and other prominent human experiences, such as religious and esthetic ones, is a fruitful area for research [112] . Another critical issue is the role of environmental influences, such as early experiences, formal education and ordinary interpersonal transactions, in shaping the neural architectures underlying moral emotions and effortful moral processing. Some of these puzzles are being illuminated by contemporary neuroscience research. Effective remedial approaches to detrimental changes in personality may eventually emerge from advances in the neuroscience of morality.
